Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) must be capable of detecting new and unknown attacks, or anomalies. We study the problem of building detection models for both pure anomaly detection and combined misuse and anomaly detection (i.e., detection of both known and unknown intrusions). We show the necessity of artificial anomalies by discussing the failure to use conventional inductive learning methods to detect anomalies. We propose an algorithm to generate artificial anomalies to coerce the inductive learner into discovering an accurate boundary between known classes (normal connections and known intrusions) and anomalies. Empirical studies show that our pure anomaly-detection model trained using normal and artificial anomalies is capable of detecting more than 77% of all unknown intrusion classes with more than 50% accuracy per intrusion class. The combined misuse and anomaly-detection models are as accurate as a pure misuse detection model in detecting known intrusions and are capable of detecting at least 50% of unknown intrusion classes with accuracy measurements between 75 and 100% per class.
Introduction
Data analysis tasks can be broadly categorized into anomaly detection and classification problems. Anomaly detection tracks events that are inconsistent with or deviate from events that are known or expected. For example, in intrusion detection, anomaly-detection systems flag observed activities that deviate significantly from established normal usage profiles. On the other hand, classification systems use patterns of well-known classes to match and identify known labels for unlabeled datasets. In intrusion detection, classification of known attacks is also called misuse detection.
Anomaly-detection systems are not as well studied, explored, or applied as classification systems. Most of the leading commercial intrusion detection systems (IDSs) employ solely misuse detection techniques, which use patterns of known attacks to detect intrusions. However, as anecdotes of serious break-ins to major government, military and commercial sites have shown, our adversaries, knowing that intrusion prevention and detection systems are installed in our networks, will always be attempting to develop and launch new attacks. The Distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) attacks in 2000 have caused major disruptions for services provided over the Internet.
In the generation of classification models, training data containing instances of known classes is often available for training (or human analysis) and the goal is simply to detect instances of these known classes. Anomaly detection, however, relies on data belonging to one single class (such as purely normal connection records) or limited instances of some known classes with the goal of detecting all unknown classes. It is difficult to use traditional inductive learning algorithms for such a task, as most are only good at distinguishing the boundaries among all given classes of data. In this paper, we explore the use of traditional inductive learning algorithms for anomaly detection by working from the dataset level. We present methods for generating artificial anomalies based on known classes to coerce an arbitrary machine learning algorithm to learn hypotheses that separate all known classes from unknown classes. We discuss the generation of anomaly-detection models from pure normal data and also discuss the generation of combined misuse and anomaly-detection models from data that contains known classes. We apply the proposed approaches to network-based intrusions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the motivation for artificial anomaly generation and the different methods. In Sections 3-6, we evaluate our methods using RIPPER (Cohen 1995) , an inductive rule learner, trained and tested with the 1998 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation dataset. Section 7 reviews related work in anomaly detection. Section 8 offers conclusive remarks and discusses avenues for future work.
Artificial anomaly generation
A major difficulty in using machine learning methods for anomaly detection lies in making the learner discover boundaries between known and unknown classes. Because we begin without any examples of anomalies in our training data (by definition of the task of anomaly detection), a machine learning algorithm will only uncover boundaries that separate different known classes in the training data. This behaviour is intended to prevent overfitting a model to the training data. Learners only generate hypotheses for the provided class labels in the training data. These hypotheses define decision boundaries that separate the given class labels. To achieve generalization and avoid overfitting, learning algorithms usually do not specify a boundary beyond that necessary to separate known classes.
Some learners can generate a default classification for instances that are not covered by the learned hypothesis. The label of this default classification is often defined to be the most frequently occurring class of all uncovered instances in the training data. It is possible to modify this default prediction to be anomaly, signifying that any uncovered instance should be considered anomalous. It is also possible to tune the parameters of some learners to coerce them into learning more specific hypotheses. As shown in Sect. 6.1, our experimentation with these methods does not yield a reasonable performance.
The failure of using more specific hypotheses and modifying a model's default prediction has motivated us to propose artificial anomaly generation for such a task. Artificial anomalies are injected into the training data to help the learner discover a boundary around the original data. All artificial anomalies are given the class label anomaly. Our approach to generating artificial anomalies focuses on "near misses," instances that are close to the known data but are not in the training data. We assume the training data are representative; hence, near misses can be safely assumed to be anomalous. Our artificial anomaly generation methods are independent of the learning algorithm, as the anomalies are merely added to the training data.
Naive artificial anomaly generation
One simple method for generating artificial anomalies is to produce random instances that span the complete domain defined by all features. A value for each feature is chosen randomly from the definition domain of that feature. The artificial anomalies produced will be uniformly distributed across the domain defined by all features. If instances of known classes are clustered into small areas of that domain and a sufficient amount of artificial anomalies is produced, the learner should be able to uncover the boundary between known and unknown classes as it tries to separate known classes from artificial anomalies. As discussed in Sect. 6.3, this method is somewhat effective. The domain of the decision space, the complexity of the target decision boundary, the amount of known data and the amount of artificial anomalies produced all play important roles in the effectiveness of this approach. Because we do not know the decision boundary or the true domain of the space in which all known classes reside, it is difficult to estimate how many artificial anomalies are sufficient for effective learning.
Distribution-based artificial anomaly generation
An alternative approach is to generate artificial anomalies that are based on the known data. Because we do not know where the exact decision boundary is between the known and anomalous instances, we assume that the boundary may be very close to the existing data. To generate artificial anomalies close to the known data, a useful heuristic is to randomly change the value of one feature of an example while leaving the other features unaltered.
Some regions of known data in the instance space may be sparsely populated. We compare sparse regions to small islands and dense regions to large islands in an ocean. To avoid overfitting, learning algorithms are usually biased toward discovering more general hypotheses. Because we only have known data, we want to prevent hypotheses from being overly general when predicting these known classes. That is, sparse regions may be grouped into dense regions to produce singularly large regions covered by overly general hypotheses. Using our analogy, small islands are unnecessarily grouped into large islands to form apparently larger islands. It is possible to produce artificial anomalies around the edges of these sparse regions and coerce the learning algorithm to discover the specific boundaries that distinguish these regions from the rest of the instance space. In other words, we want to generate data that Curved line is the border of instance space. The area enclosed in the curved line is the instance space.
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Note: The algorithm can be modified to take a factor, n, and produce n × |D| artificial anomalies. will amplify these sparse regions. The intuitive idea of sparse regions and artificially generated anomalies around sparse regions is illustrated in Fig. 1 .
Sparse regions are characterized by infrequent values of individual features. To amplify sparse regions, we proportionally generate more artificial anomalies around sparse regions depending on their scarcity using a proposed algorithm presented in detail in Fig. 2 . Assuming that the value v of some feature f is infrequently present in the dataset, we calculate the difference between the number of occurrences of v, countV , and the number of occurrences of the most frequently occurring value v max of the given feature, countV max . We then randomly sample countV max −countV data points from the training set. For each data point d in this sample, we replace the value of feature f , v f , with any v such that v = v ∧ v = v f to generate an artificial anomaly, d . The learning algorithm used will then specifically cover all instances of the data with value v for feature f . This anomaly generation process is called distribution-based artificial anomaly generation, as the distribution of a feature's values across the training data is used to selectively generate artificial anomalies.
One way to verify the need to generate countV max − countV anomalies for each value v is to produce a uniform number of anomalies for each v. Our experiments show that this method is ineffective. Our surmise is that artificial anomalies computed uniformly will not effectively force the learning algorithm to distinguish sparse regions from the rest of the example space.
Desiderata
One critical assumption of the artificial anomaly-generation algorithm is that the original training data is sufficient and representative. When this assumption is violated, artificial anomalies will intersect with the original training data, and the computed anomaly detection models are very likely to incur higher false alarm rates. Data sufficiency is a general problem for many machine learning algorithms, including distribution-based artificial anomaly generation algorithms. One simple method to test data sufficiency is to plot the histogram of each feature's values. When there is no significant change in the histogram, the data can be assumed sufficient.
The total number of artificial anomalies depends on the number of unique feature values in the training data. Assume that feature f has |V f | unique feature values. Then the maximum number of artificial anomalies computed for feature f is |V f | · countV max − v∈V f countV (v) , which is at most |V f | · countV max ( f ). Taking into account every feature, the maximum number of anomalies is therefore f ∈F |V f | · countV max ( f ). In practice, we don't need all artificial anomalies. The inner loop of the DBA2 algorithm (loop i : countV ≤ i ≤ countV max ) can take a parameter to generate only a portion of the artificial anomalies. Our experiments show that the amount of artificial anomalies do not significantly influence the accuracy of the learned models.
Filtered artificial anomalies
In the above discussion, we assume that artificial anomalies do not intersect with any known data. In the DARPA dataset (see Sect. 3), there are 41 features. A few of these features have two possible values, but most of them are either continuous or contain more than five values. Because the total size of the training data is significantly smaller than 2 41 (the lower bound of the feature domain), the chance of intersection is very small. We could always check for collision with known instances, but this is a very expensive process. Another approach is to filter artificial anomalies with hypotheses learned on the original data. We use the training set plus an initial generation of artificial anomalies to learn a model. We then evaluate this model over previously generated artificial anomalies and remove any anomalies classified as some known class. This process is repeated until the size of the set of artificial anomalies remains relatively stable.
Experimental setup
To generate our models, we have chosen to use RIPPER (Cohen 1995) , an inductive decision tree learner. RIPPER can learn both unordered and ordered rulesets. The use of these types of rulesets in ID has been discussed in our previous work (Fan et al. 2000) . In all reported results, unless clearly stated, we always use an unordered RIPPER ruleset and inject an amount of distribution-based artificial anomalies equal to the size of the training set (i.e., we use DBA2 with n = 1). Our experiments use data distributed by the 1998 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation Program, which was conducted by MIT Lincoln Lab (available from the UCI KDD repository as the 1999 KDD Cup Dataset). We use the same taxonomy for categorization of intrusions as was used by the DARPA evaluation. This taxonomy places intrusions into one of four categories: denial of service (DOS), probing (PRB), remotely gaining illegal remote access to a local account or service (R2L) and local user gaining illegal root access (U2R). The DARPA data were gathered from a simulated military network and includes a wide variety of intrusions injected into the network over a period of 7 weeks. The data was then processed into connection records using MADAM ID (Lee 1999) . A 10% sample was taken that maintained the same distribution of intrusions and normal connections as the original data (this sample is available as kddcup.data.10% from the UCI KDD repository). We used 80% of this sample as training data and left the remaining 20% unaltered to be used as test data for evaluation of learned models. For infrequent intrusions in the training data, the records for those connections were repeatedly injected to prevent the learning algorithm from neglecting them as statistically insignificant and not generating any rules for them. For overwhelming intrusions in the training data, only 1 out of 20 records were sampled. This is an ad hoc approach, but it produces reasonable results. Table 1 shows the category (U2R, R2L, DOS, PRB) and sampling rate of each intrusion.
Pure anomaly detection
For pure anomaly detection, we learned a model using all available normal connections augmented by DBA2 anomalies generated from these normal connections. We refer to this collection as dataset 0 . RIPPER learns a large number of rules for both normal and anomaly from this dataset. Table 2 shows the results of the pure anomaly detection model. We use detection rate and false alarm rate to evaluate performance. These terminologies are commonly adopted in the intrusion-detection community. Anomaly-detection rate, or percent- age of occurrences of some unknown intrusion i that are detected as anomalies, is defined as %a
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where A is the set of all predicted anomalies and W i is the set of occurrences of label i in the dataset. We omit the subscript i where the meaning is clear from the context. Similarly, we calculate cumulative anomaly-detection rate over all unknown intrusions (%a ttl ) and cumulative anomalydetection rate over different categories of unknown intrusions (such as %a u2r ). Also, we measure the false-alarm rate (% far) of anomalous classifications. This is the percentage of predicted anomalies that are normal connections, and is defined as % far = | A∩W normal | | A| × 100%. If a measurement has a value of 0, we represent it with "−" to enhance readability of the presented tables.
The cumulative anomaly-detection rate over all intrusions and false alarm rate are shown in Table 2 (a). The anomaly-detection model successfully detects 94.26% of all anomalous connections in the test data and has a false-alarm rate of 2.02%. To examine the performance for specific intrusion classes and categories, the anomalydetection rate (%a) for each class and category is shown in Table 2(b). The anomalydetection model is capable of detecting most intrusion classes, even though there are no intrusions at all in the training set. A total of 17 out of 22 intrusion classes (all nonnull measurements) are detected as anomalies. For 13 out of 22 intrusions (all entries highlighted by √ ), the proposed method catches at least 50% of all occurrences. There are three intrusions (guess_passwd, buffer_overflow and phf ) that our approach is capable of detecting perfectly (i.e., %a = 100%). These three intrusions belong to the more harmful U2R and R2L categories. The anomaly-detection rates of all four categories of intrusions indicate that, in general, each category is successfully detected. In three out of four categories (U2R, R2L and DOS), the model detects more than or nearly 50% of all intrusion occurrences of that category. It is important to note that these three categories are the most damaging and most important types of intrusions to be detected.
Combined misuse and anomaly detection
Pure anomaly detection might still have high false-alarm rates; the boundaries implied by artificial anomalies can be sharpened by real intrusions. Separate modules for anomaly and misuse detection will not be as efficient as one single module that detects misuse and anomaly at the same time. All these have motivated us to explore the use of artificial anomalies for such a task.
We learn a single ruleset for combined misuse and anomaly detection. The ruleset has rules to classify a connection to be normal, one of the known intrusion classes, or anomaly. In order to evaluate this combined approach, we group intrusions together into a number of small clusters as shown in Table 3 . We create datasets (dataset i , 1 ≤ i ≤ 12) 1 by incrementally adding each cluster i into the normal dataset and regenerating artificial anomalies. This is to simulate the process of the invention of new intrusions and their incorporation into the training set. We later evaluate the effect of the ordering of the clusters on the experimental results. We learn models that contain misuse rules for the intrusions that are known in the training data, anomalydetection rules for unknown intrusions in left-out clusters and rules that characterize normal behaviour.
Each cluster contains intrusions that require similar features for effective detection. Clusters should not be confused with the attack categories in our taxonomy. One example of a cluster contains the following intrusions: buffer_overflow, loadmodule, perl and rootkit. These intrusions all attempt to gain unauthorized root access to a local machine and require features such as root_shell (whether a root shell is obtained) and su_ flag (an indication of whether the su root command has been used in any of its derivations). Some clusters have completely disjoint feature sets, yet some intersect slightly. A model that is trained to detect intrusions from one cluster may have difficulties detecting intrusions from another cluster. For clusters with intersecting feature sets, we hope that a model learned using training instances of intrusions from some cluster may be used to detect intrusions of other clusters as anomalies.
Before explaining our results, we must define some frequently used terms. Any intrusion class that appears in the training data is a known intrusion. Similarly, any intrusion class not in the training set is an unknown intrusion, or true anomaly. Predicted anomalies include true anomalies and may also include instances of known intrusions and normal. We use anomaly to refer to predicted anomaly where our intention is clear from context.
Results
Our results for combined misuse and anomaly-detection methods are shown in Tables 4-8 and Figs. 4-6. Based on the outcome of detection, we calculate the following measurements: true class detection rate (%tc), anomaly-detection rate (%a), and other class detection rate (%othr). The relationship of these metrics is shown in the Venn diagram in Fig. 3 . The outside rectangle represents the set of data to be evaluated and the inside ellipse depicts the set of alarms generated by our learned detection models. True class detection rate measures the percentage of connection class i (normal or intrusions) being correctly predicted as its true class, and is defined as %tc = |P i ∩W i | |W i | × 100%, where P i is the set of predictions with label i. We use na (or not available) if the value of %tc is undefined, which is the case when an intrusion was not included in the training data. %a is defined as in Sect. 4.1, but it can be measured for both known and unknown intrusions or intrusion categories that are predicted as anomalies. Other class detection rate, or the rate of detection as another class of intrusion, is the percentage of occurrences of intrusion i that are detected as some class of intrusion other than its true label or anomaly, and is defined as %othr = i =i |P i ∩W i | |W i | × 100%. Additionally, total detection rate is defined as %ttl = %tc + %a + %othr.
We examine our results from several perspectives. First, it is important to see how the proposed method influences the true class detection rate (%tc) of known intrusions. Ideally, using artificial anomalies should allow anomaly detection to classify true anomalies without degrading the performance of detecting known intrusions with misuse rules. Second, we evaluate the effectiveness of detecting true anomalies. Third, we examine whether anomalous classification can compensate for low detection rates of known intrusions by misuse rules. Finally, we show the false alarm rates of anomaly detection in different test settings.
True class detection. The true class detection rates of models learned with and without DBA2 are shown in Fig. 4 . The x-axis shows each dataset, ranging from dataset 1 to dataset 12 as explained in Sect. 5. We see that the curves for R2L, DOS and PRB are indistinguishable. The difference in U2R curves is reasonably small as well 2 . This observation shows that the proposed DBA method does not deteriorate the effectiveness of detecting particular categories of known intrusions. Next, we examine the efficacy of our approach in detecting anomalies.
True anomaly detection. The effectiveness of detecting true anomalies is shown in the second column of all subtables in Tables 4-6. In all subtables, intrusion classes with na entries in the %tc columns are true anomalies, as they do not exist in the training data, and thus have no misuse rules generated for them. In analysis, we consider an anomaly-detection model to be significant for a particular detection class if %a ≥ 50.00%. All significant results are highlighted by √ . Across 12 experiment settings, there are 122 truly anomalous cases, and among them, 92 are significant; this is more than 75%. For each experiment setting, the percentage of cases that are significant is shown in Table 7 ; most are at least 70%. On the other hand, we found that 10 out of 122 (less than 9%) true anomaly cases are not detected. Upon closer inspection, most of them are land and spy. These two intrusions are usually detected by specific features, like land_flag. The datasets most likely do not contain values for these features that are needed to distinguish these intrusions from other known classes. The DBA2 anomalies generated from each dataset will thus not help in revealing the decision boundary (Sect. 8 discusses an alternative approach addressing this issue).
Next, we study the effectiveness of anomaly detection on different categories of true anomalies. We measure anomaly-detection rate (%a) of true anomalies in each intrusion category and all true anomalies (TTL). The results are presented in Table 8 . As shown in the upper rightmost curve and the last row of the table under TTL, the true anomaly-detection rate for all true anomalies remains relatively constant as we inject more clusters of intrusions. The curves for U2R, R2L and PRB categories are more bumpy than DOS because the anomaly-detection model catches more in one category and fewer in the others.
Known intrusions detected as anomalies.
It is interesting to determine if the proposed approach can prove effective in detecting unclassified known intrusions as anomalies. We consider an anomaly-detection method to significantly compensate for misuse detection if either the anomaly detection increases the total rate of detection to nearly 100% (%tc + %a 100%, %tc < 100%) or %a ≥ 0.25 × %tc when %tc is very low. In Tables 4 and 5, all significant compensations are highlighted by . There are 88 cases that are candidates for compensation (i.e., %tc < 100%). Among them, 76 cases (or 86%) are significantly compensated by being detected as anomalies. In 5 of the remaining 12 cases, the intrusions are detected as some other intrusion, leaving no room for anomaly detection to provide any compensation. In Fig. 5 , we show the total percentage of detection (%ttl) for all four categories of intrusions. As expected, there is a general trend of increase.
Overall performance. In the above discussion, we have covered the performance of true anomaly-detection and misuse detection compensation. We now examine the combined overall performance of detecting both true anomalies and known intrusions. The results over all four intrusion categories are shown in the bottom of each subtable of Tables 4 to 6, and the curves (%a) are shown in Fig. 6 . As expected, Fig. 6 . Percentage of known intrusions and true anomalies detected as anomalies (%a) there is a general trend of decrease in %a when the datasets are augmented with more clusters of intrusions. This is caused by the fact that we have learned misuse rules for more intrusions, leaving less room for these intrusions to be detected as anomalies. The shape of the anomaly-detection rate curves is somewhat inversely related to their respective true-class detection curves in Fig. 4 . This relationship is explained by the observation that 1−%tc is an indication of the amount of additional detection that anomaly detection can provide. These decreasing and inverse relationships apply throughout the U2R, R2L and DOS curves, and can be seen in the PRB curves with x ∈ [6, 12]. As we see in Fig. 4 , as more intrusion clusters are used to augment the normal data, the true-class detection rates for both U2R and R2L increase and leave less room for anomaly detection to compensate. This explains the generally decreasing tendency of U2R and R2L %a curves. For DOS attacks, the true-class detection rate only rises from 0 to 30% after dataset 9 , and there is still sufficient room for compensation by anomaly detection-this explains the flatness of the DOS %a curve in Fig. 6 . For PRB, the rise in %tc takes place after dataset 6 , which is also when we see the complimentary decrease in %a when x ∈ [6, 12] . The slight bumpiness of the U2R %a curve is due to the inverse bumpiness of U2R %tc curve in Fig. 4 . The slight bumpiness of the DOS and PRB curves are most likely caused by insufficient feature values available when learning a decision boundary for anomalies (see Sect. 8).
The last row of each subtable within Tables 4 to 6 displays the false-alarm rate of anomalous classification. All these values are uniformly below 0.40%. This confirms that nearly all detected anomalies are either true anomalies or known intrusions. Additionally, the %tc rates of normal connections (or normal correctly classified as normal), as shown in the first row of each subtable, are over or near 99.00%. These observations show the utility of the anomaly-detection approach in building highly precise models.
Effects of cluster ordering. We performed two tests to verify that our results are not influenced by the order in which clusters are added to the training sets. One test is to reverse the cluster ordering as in the previous section, and the other one is a random ordering totally different from the original or second orderings. The results have confirmed that our results are indeed not influenced by cluster order.
Additional issues
We now present our experimentation with different methods of anomaly generation for further verification of the proposed approach.
Necessity of artificial anomalies
To confirm the motivation of using artificial anomaly generation for classifying anomalies, we generated unordered rulesets from each dataset without any artificial anomalies and modified the default classification label to be anomaly 3 as discussed in Sect. 2. We used different levels of specificity (different optimization levels -O from 0 to 2, and used very specific rule forms -E. Both -O and -E are parameters to run RIPPER). The results (not shown) indicate that these rulesets, in general, do not correctly detect many anomalies at all. The total number detected is very small and % far is very high (> 50%). Another observation is that rules learned from datasets with artificial anomalies are significantly more complex than rules trained without artificial anomalies, as shown in Table 9 . The size differs by an average of about 150 rules. Upon closer inspection, half of these extra rules are for normal and the other half are for anomaly. The reason is simple: artificial anomalies force RIPPER to discover very specific decision boundaries that are not revealed by known classes alone.
Different experiment settings
We have experimented with different amounts of injected artificial anomalies (n = 1.5 or 2). The general trend is that, as we increase the injection amount, %tc of normal connections decreases slightly and % far increases slightly. In the worst case, %tc drops to slightly over 91% and % far increases to approximately 3%. The %a rate changes slightly as well, with some intrusion categories having greater %a rate, and some less, than when n = 1. On average, however, increased amounts of artificial anomalies is still as effective as with n = 1 (in the reported results). One explanation is that, when the amount of injected artificial anomalies increases, there are more artificial anomalies than normal connections in the training data and the learning algorithm tends to generate more anomaly rules. In general, however, the proposed algorithm is not sensitive to the amount of artificial anomalies in the training data. However, it would be interesting to conduct a full range test on n.
We experimented with the use of other forms of RIPPER rulesets (+ freq and given, both of which are ordered rulesets). As discussed by Fan et al. (2000) , ordered rulesets are more efficient in real-time evaluation. + freq rulesets classify connections in order of increasing frequency followed by normal, with a default classification of anomaly. For given, we used the following rule order: normal, anomaly and alphabetically ordered intrusion classes (essentially arbitrary). This given ruleset filters normal connections efficiently, as they are classified first. The results gathered for the use of a + freq ruleset are very close to the detailed results given for our unordered rulesets. It is interesting to observe that the given rulesets are similar to unordered rulesets at later datasets (when more than three clusters of intrusions are added to the normal data). However, in the first two datasets (dataset 1 and dataset 2 ), the anomaly detection is more likely to classify known intrusions as anomalies. This is due to the fact that anomaly rules appear before intrusion rules.
Other artificial anomaly methods
To test the effectiveness of DBA2, we tested this method by randomly choosing a feature value to perturb, instead of biasing the choice to values that are more sparsely distributed as discussed in Sect. 2.2. We tested this method by randomizing any one randomly chosen feature, generating an artificial anomaly sample set with n = 1, and then learning unordered RIPPER rulesets. The experiments were run on all datasets (0-12). Our results indicate that the %tc rates for each connection class (including normal) and %a are significantly lower than the respective DBA2 approach. The %tc rate for normal connections decreases to slightly above 51% in the worst case. The %tc rates for intrusions are also slightly reduced. The % far rate for all 13 experiments increased to slightly below 11%. In other words, the ruleset classifies more normal and known intrusions as anomalies. This verification method provides additional evidence for the effectiveness of the DBA2 proposal.
In Sect. 2.1, we discussed a random-generation approach that produces artificial anomalies uniformly across the entire decision space. We produced a random sample for each dataset (the same size as the dataset) and trained over all of these datasets (0-12). Our results showed some detection of anomalies, but the amount was significantly less than was seen with the DBA2 approach. A close comparison of the respective rules showed that the difference in rules for the same connection class is minor. It is reasonable to deduce that the naively generated anomalies are not sufficient.
We experimented with the filtering method for DBA2 as proposed in Sect. 2.2. The generated artificial anomalies were filtered three times, with a resulting reduction of between 1 and 3% each time. We did not see any significant improvement in performance using this method. We also experimented with filtering anomalies generated using the naive approach and observed that no artificial anomalies were removed at all. The main conclusion to be drawn from these filtering experiments is that most artificial anomalies are truly anomalous and do not collide with known training data.
Related work
SRI's IDES (Javitz and Valdes 1991) measures abnormality of current system activity from the probability distributions of past activities. The activities they monitored are host events (e.g., CPU utilization and file accesses); in our work, we monitor network events. Forrest et al. (1996) record frequent subsequences of system calls that are used in the execution of a program (e.g., sendmail). Absence of subsequences in the current execution of the same program from the stored sequences constitutes a potential anomaly. Lane and Brodley (1998) used a similar approach, but they focused on an incremental algorithm that updates the stored sequences and used data from UNIX shell commands. Lee (1999) , using a rule learning program, generated rules that predict the current system call based on a window of previous system calls. Abnormality is suspected when the predicted system call deviates from the actual system call. Ghosh and Schwartzbard (1999) proposed using a neural network to learn a profile of normality. Similar to our approach, random behaviours are generated to represent abnormality for training purposes. Unlike our approach, each of their input features is a distance value from an exemplar sequence of BSM (SunSoft 1995) events. This study is one of the first attempts in applying machine learning algorithms to network events for anomaly detection.
Algorithms for anomaly detection and misuse detection have traditionally been studied separately. In SRI's EMERALD (Neumann and Porras 1999) , anomaly and misuse detection algorithms are encased in separate system components, though their output responses are correlated to generate alarms by the resolver. Ghosh and Schwartzbard (1999) applied neural networks to both anomaly and misuse detection and compared their relative performance. One of our unique goals in this paper is to study the combination of anomaly and misuse detection in one model to improve overall performance.
We are not aware of closely related work in the generation of training data belonging to an unknown opposite class. Given unlabeled instances, Nigam et al. (1998) assigned labels to them using a classifier trained from labeled data and put them in the training set for another round of training. In a skewed distribution scenario, Kubat and Matwin (1997) attempted to remove majority instances too close to and too far from the decision boundary. Maxion and Tan (2000) used conditional entropy to measure the regularity in the training set and have shown that it is easier to detect anomalies for data with high regularity. Lee and Xiang (2001) also applied entropy to determine how hard it is to learn a model of normality and abnormality.
Conclusion and future work
Recent hacker activity has made evident the importance of network-based intrusion detection. Anomaly detection of unknown intrusions is an important and difficult area of IDS. In this paper, we studied the problems of using artificial anomalies to detect unknown and known network intrusions. We proposed a distribution-based anomaly generation algorithm that has proven effective in building anomaly and combined misuse and anomaly-detection models that successfully detect known and unknown intrusions.
One assumption of DBA2 is that each dimension (i.e., feature) can be treated individually. In other words, we examine and generate anomalies dimension by dimension. If all features have similar importance to the learner in formulating a model, anomalies generated using this assumption will be effective. A possible variation of the algorithm could consider multiple dimensions concurrently or give each dimension a different weight depending on its importance.
